

UNCLASSIFIED

--

PRESS
REPORTS

Adelbert Weinstein wrote in the December 18 Frankfurter Allgemeine that the debate on US aid to Angola shows that "once again the US Congress is acting as a collateral administration." Weinstein added

"...all concerned side with the position taken by the legislature, while hardly anyone shows understanding for the compelling situation facing the executive. If Congressmen, seeing nothing but the coming elections, prevail over the President and his Secretary of State, pro-Western forces in Angola will be deprived of any American protection, with the result that the Soviets will win another round in the geostrategic poker game...."

Weinstein concluded that the "security policy of the West as a whole" will be affected "if the President and his Secretary of State are forced to refrain from taking any action...."

Daily Telegraph
19 Dec 76
CONGRESS GREEN LIGHT

CONGRESS IN WASHINGTON seems determined to beam a green light towards Moscow, giving it the all-clear to go ahead in Angola without fear of any American counter-action. How American diplomacy can be expected to function effectively against this sort of background is difficult to imagine. No one would expect the US Marines to storm ashore across the beaches of Luanda, but there are many ways in which Russia might be persuaded to moderate its intervention in Angola, given a reasonably responsible mood in Congress. That mood does not seem to be there at present. So strongly does the spectre of Vietnam haunt the Congressmen and Senators that they are all set to cut off any aid, covert or overt channelled through Zaire for the anti-M P L A forces in Angola.

It is obvious that Russia attaches much importance to the effort it is making. Among many indications of its scale is the revelation that Cuban troops bound for Angola have been staging through Barbados, though the Barbados Government says it has now stopped that. The point of the Russians ordering up the Cubans to do their fighting for them is, of course, that they are not Whites. This is where the position of South Africa becomes such a complicating factor. The announcement in Pretoria that four members of the Defence Forces have been taken prisoner hundreds of miles inside Angola, and that the services of some national servicemen are to be extended by a month, has somewhat naturally caused concern in South Africa. It would not be surprising if the South African Government feels it is being let down and dangerously over-exposed by the failure of the major Western Powers to help.

Innocence is not enough

ANGOLA is not just an African problem. It has been allowed to develop into a world problem with serious implications for the future of world peace. It is already affecting adversely the relations of the Soviets, China, the United States and Western Europe, in addition to those of the African States. And the sooner these real dangers are understood, the better the chance of reducing them.

It is important to be clear about the actual nature of this crisis. To describe it as having the makings of a 'mini-Vietnam' is seriously (perhaps deliberately) misleading. It suggests the repetition of a uniquely circumstanced American involvement in a foreign conflict far from its own national interests. It, thus, provides a pretext that American isolationists and liberals have eagerly seized to combine against Dr Henry Kissinger—who has recently been accused, alternatively, of being too *détentiste* and too interventionist. Now, he is held to be responsible for the Angolan crisis.

The truth is that this crisis originates from two different sources. First, the Western refusal a decade ago to help the Africans in their struggle against Portuguese colonialism; help then would have enabled the Africans to prepare for independence. And, second, the decision taken by the Russians to provide strong military support to one of the three rival movements, the MPLA, in defiance of the declared policy of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that all three rival movements should have an *equal* claim to sharing in government.

By seeking to help one of the rivals to establish its ascendancy over the others, the Soviets are doing precisely what the critics allege the Americans might do. Those who justify Moscow's policies by citing the irresponsible South African intervention against the MPLA conveniently overlook that Pretoria moved in its troops only after the Russian military build-up.

South Africa's intervention is seriously counter-productive. Pretoria's greatest service to the West would be to get out of Angola, completely and at once. Fortunately there are grounds for supposing that Mr Vorster would do so, if the Soviets would do the same.

The OAU has also been demanding just this. But how realistic is it to suppose that all the major foreign powers could be got to withdraw? To answer this question it is necessary first to understand Russia's motives for choosing this moment to extend Soviet influence into an area where, at present, there is none worth speaking of.

There are two plausible explanations for Moscow's intervention. First, the Soviets may feel an urgent interest in counteracting what they seriously believe to be 'the spread of Chinese influence in Africa' (about which they are now as obsessed as the Americans used to be). Secondly, Moscow may be testing how far they can risk going in exploiting the present paralysis in America's ability to act decisively in foreign affairs.

The Observer

21 Dec 75

If the Russians can get away with acting through the MPLA (not, it should be emphasised, itself a Communist front) to take and hold power in Angola, they could hope to achieve a triple victory. They would have demonstrated their power in a continent which has traditionally been a major Western sphere of interest. They would have put themselves in a position to play a possibly decisive role in the coming struggle for power in Southern Africa. And, finally, they would have shaken Chinese confidence and prestige throughout the Third World by destroying the assumption that underlies all Chinese foreign policy: that America can and will neutralise Soviet military power and prevent its extension.

The immediate risk is not that Angola would be turned into a Soviet satellite. None of the African governments which relied on one or other of the foreign powers to achieve power has allowed its country to be used as an outpost for the Russians or Americans. The real risk, indeed the probability, is that a Russian success in Angola would lead to its major international rivals (both the US and the Chinese) becoming much more deeply involved in the struggles in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa—thereby insuring the internationalisation of the gathering violent conflicts in Southern Africa.

Contrary to what is now being put about (especially among the great breast-beating American public) the Ford Administration originally showed no desire to become involved in Angola, due both to domestic and international considerations. It was only *after* the Russians had rejected Washington's

diplomatic proposals for both sides to keep out, and had chosen to escalate their arms shipments, that Kissinger overrode his own advisers. Even then, he only supplied enough arms through a third party—Zaire—to warn the Russians that they could not expect to get away with their intervention unchallenged.

Kissinger's policy of trying to get the Russians to back away from playing a major role in Angola has now been stymied by Congress. The votes of the Congressmen last week were a clear invitation to Moscow to proceed with the bold Soviet African strategy.

The reasons for Congress's actions are perfectly understandable; but they are, nevertheless, profoundly mistaken. In the aftermath of Vietnam, of the Watergate scandal and of the CIA inquiry, liberal Americans—pursuing the traditional United States policy of 'open government'—are engaged in what amounts to a crusade against any form of foreign policy other than the use of words. These high-minded men should urgently re-read the late Professor Denis Brogan's classic of the thirties, 'Is innocence enough?'

making some or the American clandestine operations contemplated and proposed in the past, it is naive to suppose that any major political Power, let alone one of two super-Powers, can operate effectively in the prevention of world war and the support of its friends if its policies are to be implemented only by the sending of diplomatic notes.

Would American liberals, consider today that it would have been wrong if a foreign Government's agents had succeeded in assassinating Hitler? Or if the German opposition had been equipped with whatever facilities it needed?

Authoritarian regimes, by their very nature, engage in covert operations; and they have no public opinion to embarrass them. For the democracies to assume that it is always wrong to interfere in the affairs of others, even if they are ruled by tyrants or are the victims of uninvited 'protectors' like the Russians, is to surrender a huge advantage to the authoritarians. This is one of the forgotten lessons of the catastrophic 'thirties.' But to argue this case is not to suggest American covert operations in Angola. If the US has to give help there, it should do so openly—as the Russians are doing.

It is also open to the US to exert more direct pressures on the Russians by threatening to hold up grain shipments. Such threats should obviously be used only rarely and only when all other diplomatic efforts have failed; but in this particular case, if the Americans really believe (as they very well might) that détente would be seriously affected by Russia's strategy in Angola, this action would be entirely justified. At least it might convince Moscow of the seriousness of America's concern.

Ought the Americans, then, to intervene at all in Angola? The answer is still: preferably not, but if at all, then preferably with other Western support. The immediate objective of the Western Powers should be to co-operate fully with the OAU in making a démarche in both Moscow and Pretoria, demanding the immediate ending of arms shipments and the withdrawal of all military personnel (including the Cuban pilots). This should be followed by an OAU initiative to bring about, and police, a ceasefire; the OAU should also supervise the observance of the agreement to end foreign involvement.

In this way, the three rival movements could get the time to settle their power rivalries by means other than armed combat and be left free to participate equally in a transition government—if they are able.

If, however, the Russians refuse to suspend their armed involvement, then the rest of the world should not stand aside and allow Moscow to turn Angola into another Czechoslovakia—with their 'clients' helped to power and then maintained there only with Russian support.

In the tragic eventuality of the Russians refusing to bow to combined OAU, American and European diplomatic pressures, it would be unfair to expect the Americans alone to provide arms to counteract the Russian supplies. Western Europe would be seriously failing in farsightedness if its members simply chose to stand aside—as they are inclined to do these days. In America's present mood, that could mean allowing a dominating Soviet position to develop in Southern Africa, which could prove to be as fateful an accident as was the Tsarist involvement with Serbia in the years preceding 1914.

"Talk of Resignation No Surprise"*Frankfurter Allgemeine*

Pursuing this possibility and its foreign policy implications, a byliner in today's right-center Frankfurter Allgemeine declared that Kissinger's "subtle, sophisticated foreign policy" could not work much longer with "the coarse interventions of the Senate, marked by considerations of domestic policy and by prejudice."

Dec 22 D.

Talk of resignation, dejection and an alleged intention to pause and think things through over Christmas are not surprising...


"A majority of the Senate insists on making the moral lesson of Vietnam prevail: no direct participation, no GIs to the jungle, no escalating involvement in adventures abroad. That this position has a seamy side and that America may have to pay dearly for its consequences some day presumably will be realized by the moralists in the Senate only when it is too late.... Let down in this way, no foreign minister could do his job."

The writer said further:

"Kissinger's remarkable request for aid for Angola was, of course, part of his global strategy. He wanted to demonstrate to the Russians the necessity of observing restraint in Angola. However, all that came about after the Senate debacle was a weak gesture by the President directed at Moscow."

"The question now is whether there is anything that can be done to impress the Soviets. Nothing seems to work. At the Communist Party meeting in Havana at America's doorstep, Kremlin hawk Suslov describes East-West detente as nothing but a means to avoid war."

"That is the real problem facing Kissinger and his policy of detente, and he obviously has no answer to it."



New Printing House Square, London, WC1X 8EZ. Telephone : 01-837 1234

A TEST FOR THE UNITED STATES

The United States is now facing an extremely serious test in Angola. The Russians and their Cuban allies are mounting a direct military challenge to the wishes of the majority of Angolans, to the policies of the Organization of African Unity, and to the interests of the United States. They have thereby served notice that they are more interested in extending their power in Africa than in preserving the fragile fabric of detente with the United States. If allowed to get away with this they will draw the obvious conclusion that they can repeat the experiment elsewhere. The outcome of the struggle will therefore have profound effects not only on Angola and on the African continent, but on Russian-American relations and on the future credibility of the United States as a world power.

With so much at stake it is tragic that American policy should be paralysed by the deep distrust that now exists between Congress and the Administration. Admittedly the fault is on both sides. The Executive is paying for mistakes made in Vietnam, for inept clandestine operations over many years, and for the loss of faith and self-confidence which is afflicting the United States as a whole. It is also paying for the arrogant and secretive style with which Dr Kissinger has pursued policies which might otherwise have commanded wider support. Congress has grounds for distrust and for fearing that its money may not be wisely used. The Administration will have to earn back the trust it has lost.

Yet Congress will bear a very heavy responsibility if it creates a situation in which the world ceases to believe that an American president has usable military power at his disposal. Such a situation is now very close. If allowed to develop it will destroy the United States as a world power. Senators and Congressmen should therefore think hard before allowing their dislike of Dr Kissinger to take precedence.

calculation of the long-term interests of their country. At the moment they give a strong impression of re-fighting the war in Vietnam instead of looking at the realities of Angola.

None of this means that the United States should move into Angola with guns blazing. Indeed, one of the troubles with issues of this sort is that they are too often seen by Americans as tests of masculinity rather than of political skill. It is too late now to make up for years of neglect of African politics but it is not too late to see that the essential issue for American foreign policy should be not whether to defend American interests abroad but how best to do so.

Angola does not require direct military intervention by the United States. It does not even require the military defeat of the MPLA. Still less does it require the United States to line up with South Africa. Essentially it requires support for the Organization of African Unity which agreed at its summit conference in July that all three rival Angolan movements had an equally valid claim to share power and that there should be no international involvement in Angola.

This policy requires military force only to the extent of creating a stalemate to provide the basis for a political solution. This is what African leaders want, and many of them are discreetly anxious that the United States should help by providing sufficient weapons to ensure that the forces of Unita and the FNLA are not wiped off the field. The other requirement is for diplomatic activity, and in particular for American pressure on the Russians. It is now reasonably clear that although the Americans, the Chinese and the Russians had been giving modest help to rival factions for some time it was the Russians who decided wholly to ignore the OAU and to upset the balance by mounting a major airlift and sending in Cuban troops.

The reasons for the Russian

Mr Brezhnev may want to test the American will after Vietnam, especially since he is well-informed about the mood of Congress. He may also have felt a need to compensate for other failures, including the harvest disaster. Perhaps he was anxious about Chinese influence, in Africa. Perhaps he was simply too weak to stop his generals reaching for such a glittering prize. Or perhaps he felt he had to live up to his constant promises to help "wars of liberation". He has, after all, never accepted the American doctrine that detente obliges him to cease manoeuvring for advantage. Whatever the reason he was warned several times that he was endangering detente and he went ahead anyway. He must therefore be shown that crime does not pay, if necessary by drastic and difficult steps such as stopping grain deliveries.

There is very little point in detente if it does not restrain the Russians from adventures such as they have engaged upon in Angola. As Dr Kissinger himself has regularly explained, his aim has been to enmesh the Russians in a web of agreements and relationships that will give them a stake in moderate behaviour. This policy is now being tested. Congress should see this and unless it actually wants the policy to fail it should provide Dr Kissinger with the backing he needs, even if subject to very close congressional control.

Here after all, is a situation in which the United States could, if it used more skill than force, be seen to be acting in support of enlightened African opinion and the independence of Angola against Russian colonialism. Many Africans are aware of what a Russian presence in Angola could mean, and even the MPLA is not anxious to become a puppet of the Russians. American influence intelligently applied on behalf of a political solution could reap dividends all round. Congress should realize that

F.

"Heedless Senators Help Moscow's Cause"

Independent La Nazione of Florence also noted post-Vietnam sentiment and said the "Senate vote tends to convince the Soviets that the U. S. . . . no longer has the will to carry out its responsibilities. . . . This may induce the Russians to sound out America on more dangerous ground in the hope that the Senate will behave as it did this time. . . . The Russian objective is favored by the vote of the heedless American Senators. "

* UNCLASSIFIED *

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

ANALYSIS. IN THE FIRST PLACE IT IS INSULAR. WE TEND TO LOAD THE REST OF THE WORLD WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF -- AND OFTEN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR -- OUR PECULIAR BRITISH TROUBLES. THE UNITED STATES AND THE TWO MOST POWERFUL NATIONS WITHIN THE EEC PARTAKE OF OUR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TROUBLES TO ONLY THE MOST MARGINAL DEGREE. THERE HAS CERTAINLY BEEN SOME PROFOUND SHOCK TO THE AMERICAN POLITY AS A RESULT OF VIETNAM AND WATERGATE BUT THE BASIC STRENGTH OF THE U.S. AS AN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POWER AND AS A SOCIETY WHOSE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITIES ARE WELL UNDER CONTROL IS NOT IN DOUBT. THE MARXISTS HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO EXPLAIN SATISFACTORILY WHY THERE IS NO AMERICAN PROLETARIAT, AND IF TWILIGHT IS CREEPING OVER ANY DEMOCRACY IT IS NOT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC."

U.S. SELF-DESTRUCTIVE TENDENCIES:

31 Dec DAILY EXPRESS EDIT: "IT'S AN UNHAPPY THING ABOUT AMERICAN MANY AMERICANS ARE NOW APPARENTLY INTENT ON DESTROYING THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THEIR PRESIDENCY AND THEIR COUNTRY."

THEY HAVE BEEN ANGERED BY THE ACTIONS AND POLICIES OF SUCCESSIVE PRESIDENTS IN COMMITTING UNITED STATES FORCES AND AGENTS TO CAUSES WHICH THEY HAVEN'T APPROVED OF.

BUT NOW THEY ARE PRESSING ON INTO A NAIVE FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR COUNTRY WILL STAND FOR IN THE WORLD, AND, MORE THAN THAT, A CARELESS DISREGARD FOR THEIR COUNTRY'S SERVANTS ABROAD AND THEIR COUNTRY'S FRIENDS ABROAD.

THERE IS A WISH IN AMERICA TO NEGATE THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THAT IS CARELESS OF THE LIVES OF THE OFFICERS OF THAT AGENCY. THERE IS A WISH TO REFUSE AID TO MEN IN AFRICA OR ANYWHERE WHO PREFER TO BE FRIENDLY WITH AMERICA TO BEING FRIENDLY WITH RUSSIA OR CHINA.

THAT IS WHY THERE IS A PERSISTENT DENIGRATION OF JACK KENNEDY, BECAUSE, IT IS SAID ON ALL SIDES (AND ESPECIALLY BY THOSE WOMEN WITH A STORY TO SELL TO PUBLISHERS), HE WAS A WOMANISER. THAT IS WHY, IN A HUMBLER WAY, THERE IS A PERSISTENT ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY PRESIDENT FORD AS A SIMPLETON AND A BUMBLER.

AMERICA'S INTERNAL OPPOSITION DESTROYED LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS IDEAL OF A GREAT SOCIETY. IT DESTROYED RICHARD NIXON. IT IS NOW DETERMINED TO DESTROY MEN WHO ONLY FAULT IS TO BE HUMAN. HOW SHOULD AMERICA'S FRIENDS JUDGE SUCH ACTIVITIES?"

NO NEWSPAPERS IN LONDON NEW YEAR'S DAY. THE NEXT MEDIA

 * UNCLASSIFIED *

PAGE 03
 311120Z DEC 75
 RUEKJCS/8925

(H)

West Germany

The January 11 Der Taggespiegel remarked that Congress is continuing to paralyze the government in the domestic and political spheres.

"In order to increase its position vis-a-vis the President, the Congress used every opportunity to limit the government's ability to act in international affairs and put a chain around the President. The Kremlin laughingly observes the process of self-destruction of its great adversary."

The editorial concluded that Moscow is betting on the inner political weakness of the Western states, particularly the US, and the belief that "America can only be overcome by America."

✓

- 2 -

Italy

Mario de Medici wrote in the January 12 Il Tempo that the report of alleged CIA funding to Italian political parties proves that

"It is no longer possible to keep Congress out of American foreign policy secrets. The consequence of this new relationship between the executive and Congress is that the Administration will not be able to use covert operational instruments for a limited international action. Even a minor operation, once it is known to Congress, takes a political profile which is disproportionate with the real dimension of the problem."

(J)

5 January 1976

SUBJECT: US World Role: As Seen by London Economist

The staid and solid London Economist in editorial (2 Jan)
"America and Detente" writes inter alia:

"In end, it is question of whether American opinion understands
that there is no substitute for America."

W Europe still turns to US for most milit strength on which
free existence of that community depends.

Egypt, and increasingly Syria and Palestinians, look to
US for Arab-Israeli solution that Arabs can live with;
Israel has nowhere else but US to look for a pledge that
it will survive.

Fron Japan to Australia, the Island States of W Pacific
still lean on US connection.

The anti-Marxists of Angola reach automatically for American
help, when they are up against a Russian-backed Marxist
takeover.

There is no other center of power in non-Communist world to
which these requests for support can be delivered.

First half of 1970's was period in which many Americans
stunned by failure in Vietnam, wanted to believe that world
would go away from their door . . . 1976 is going to be a
year of waiting; A semi-vacuum year, with not enough US
pressure on Israelis and Palestinians to accept each others
existence, not enough new American ideas for coping with a
changing Russia and China.

⇒ It will be worse if vacuum is prolonged beyond 1976: If American
opinion chooses to act as if Detente had produced a world which
will no longer make so many demands on US. It is clear, at
start of this difficult year that it has NOT."

Roscoe Drummond

More 'Angolas' after Angola?

Washington

Even if Congress wants to blissfully ignore what Soviet and Cuban arms and troops are doing in Angola, many Americans, perhaps, will wish to be aware what Moscow is planning to do elsewhere after the Angola operation.

I am offering no theoretical view; it is now baldly and officially on the record. Hitler laid his plans all out for the world to read — and fatefully we didn't believe him. Now the Soviets are putting their plans in the open — and we better believe them.

Since the Senate voted to prevent President Ford from giving any American assistance of any kind to the anticommunist majority in Angola and said, in effect, to the Kremlin, "go right ahead, we'll keep looking the other way," the Kremlin has begun to put its intention more candidly and more ambitiously.

It is saying that Moscow plans to follow up the Angolan intervention with more interventions elsewhere and that if this throws detente on the scrap heap, so be it.

No subtle interpretations, no alert intelligence work, are needed to know what the Soviets are up to. Hitler wrote his plans in "Mein Kampf." We saw them unfold. The Soviets have laid out their plans in the official government newspaper Izvestia.

Here are the things which Izvestia is disclosing:

It is saying that the Soviet presence in Angola will be expanded. "The anticolonial revolution in Angola," it says, "does not end with the achievement of independence. It is quite natural that assistance should be continued."

This certainly makes it clear that when a Western nation gives a colony its independence, the Soviets intend to use arms and troops to install a pro-Soviet communist government as they did in every Eastern European country they invaded.

Izvestia is emphasizing that Moscow's intervention in Angola is not an exceptional action, which might not be repeated, but is "an important principle of Soviet foreign policy."

Since the intervention in Angola is defined as a basic "principle of Soviet foreign policy," it can be expected to be brought into play at every inviting opportunity.

Izvestia is also saying that "detente cannot mean the freezing of the social status quo around the world."

In other words, Moscow wants detente and intervention both — each when it suits its purpose. Obviously this means that the Soviets don't want the U.S. spoiling detente by countering Soviet intervention anywhere and it sees no reason why Soviet intervention should spoil detente if we will make no fuss about it.

It is evident that the Soviet government is serving notice on the West that, whenever and wherever the colonial status quo becomes unfrozen, it will be Kremlin policy to move in with arms, advisers, and supporting troops to determine the make-up of the new regime.

The Soviets are so confident the United States will remain immobile that they are making satiric jokes about Congress. Writing from Moscow in the New York Times, Christopher Wren reports this remark from a Soviet insider: "Why should we stop intervening in Angola just to please Mr. Kissinger? That would antagonize Congress!"

So far only half of Congress, the Senate, has taken the decision to ignore what the Soviets are doing to extend their presence with arms and surrogate troops deep into Africa.

The decision will not be final until the House acts after Congress reconvenes Jan. 19. Even then it may be too late; if so, some — perhaps many — Americans will want to ask whether Congress is wisely serving the security of the nation or the peace of the world.

CSM 1/7

RR RUEHMO

DE RUTAVC #0514 021011Z

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

P 210700Z JAN 76

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6101

INFO RUVQBRL/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 1802

RUEHPCQ/AMEMBASSY LOURENCO MARQUES 227

RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1221

RUEHSAB/AMCONSUL CAPETOWN 150

RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1444

RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON 849

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 215

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1716

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4814

RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 5374

RUVQDA/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1126

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1121

BT

UNCLAS KINSHASA 0514

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: AO, CG, UR, PINS

SUBJECT: ANGOLA IN ZAIRIAN PRESS

1. EDITORIAL IN GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED KINSHASA DAILY ELIMA JANUARY 20 TAGGED CUBA AS SOVIET "INSTRUMENT" IN ANGOLA. TRACED IN DETAIL CUBA'S SUBVERSIVE ROLE IN AFRICA, DATING FROM 1960'S. SAID CUBA'S MISSION IN ANGOLA IS THAT OF ESTABLISHING MARXIST REGIME IN RICH, STRATEGICALLY-SITUATED TERRITORY WHERE SOVIETS HOPE TO ESTABLISH AIR AND NAVAL BASES. CHARACTERIZED MPLA AS "NOTORIOUSLY COMMUNIST" MINORITY PARTY WHICH OWNES ITS CONTROL OF TERRITORY TO MASSIVE AND "INSOLENT" SOVIET MILITARY AID. WARNED THAT THIS INTERVENTION WILL PROVOKE A BLOOD BATH IN ANGOLA THE LIKE OF WHICH AFRICA HAS NOT SEEN SINCE 1945. CONTRASTED THIS "BRUTAL", "CYNICAL" INTERVENTION TO SOVIET PRETENSE OF GOOD FAITH AT HELSINKI AND TOWARDS DETENTE GENERALLY. INTERPRETED INTERVENTION AS SIGNIFICANT STEP IN SOVIET POLICY AIMED AT LARGER ROLE IN INDIAN OCEAN, ALONG CAPE ROUTE, AND IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. EDITORIAL CONCLUDED WITH OBSERVATION THAT IT IS NOW FOR WEST TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PICK UP THE CHALLENGE OR TO ACCEPT DEFEAT.

2. COMMENT: ELIMA EDITORIAL REPRESENTS STRONGEST AND MOST SPECIFIC CONDEMNATION TO DATE OF CUBAN ROLE IN ANGOLA AFFAIR.

CUTLER

BT

#0514

RECEIVED

JAN 22 09 47 76